Auctioning of radio spectrum in the USA was the catalyst for an explosion of academic analysis of market mechanisms, auction design and game theory. Profs. Crampton, Ausubel, Milgrom and Klemperer have advanced the development of market mechanisms significantly from Google advertising to sovereign debt. HLIX has taken these ideas to develop a highly efficient platform for the sale of single-owner portfolios with many small elements to multiple buyers. HLIX practices the Klemperer maxim, “Auction design is not ‘one size fits all.'” HLIX designs different bidding platforms for different portfolios.
“…We ﬁrst describe the underlying economic environment, and then analyze the competitive equilibrium ﬁrst for rational buyers (Section 3) and then a mixed population of buyers who vary in their cognitive sophistication (Section 4). Let b denote the total mass of buyers, while the mass of sellers is normalized to 1. Each seller owns one good whose quality q is distributed according to a continuously-diﬀerentiable cumulative distribution G with support [q, q] ⊆ (0, ∞). The quality q of the various objects is assumed to be observed by everyone in the benchmark model. We will later on consider the case in which some buyers do not observe this quality q. We assume that q fully determines both the distribution of bidders’ valuations and how much the seller values the object (possibly because, for the seller, the value is fully determined by the expected selling price in future auctions). We let vs(q)= q + H(q) denote the valuation of …” more
If you would like a fuller discussion about the theory behind the HLIX segmentation of buyers in an auction environment and exactly how bidding is tailored to each portfolio, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org